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I. Introduction
The introduction of the euro in 1999 marked an important threshold within the process of
deepening of the European integration. Yet the road to adoption of the common currency
was not smooth – the countries that decided to join the common European currency
system had to synchronize their fiscal and monetary policies through decisive and at
times painful disinflationary and budget-balancing procedures. The euro-convergence
process was undoubtedly a monumental effort, considering vast economic imbalances
that existed among these countries prior to the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 that officially
launched the euro inception program.
This paper overviews a systemic evolution of monetary policies in Europe that
lead to the inception of the euro in 1999. It also discusses the policies of the EU new
member States (NMS) that are intended to guide these countries to a risk-free adoption of
the euro in the foreseeable future. Monetary policy adjustments by the founding members
of the euro provide valuable lessons for the current convergence policies of NMS that
joined the Union in 2004 and 2007. In order to adopt the euro, they need to reach a
satisfactory level of price stability as prescribed by the Maastricht convergence criteria,
i.e. domestic inflation rate not exceeding 1.5 percent above the average rate of the three
lowest inflation countries. Since low, sustainable inflation is viewed as a predominant
outcome of credible and successful monetary policies, this analysis will focus on the
policy regimes that have secured price stability in Europe over the past 50 years, i.e. since
the launching of the European integration process by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. In
essence, the most successful disinflationary policies were initially based either on
monetary targeting or on exchange rate pegs. Monetary targeting was followed by larger
European countries, i.e. Germany and France, while smaller economies initially
embraced currency pegs. In a more recent period, a number of European countries that
have not adopted the euro yet follow fully autonomous policies based on direct inflation
targeting. Such policies are believed to be conducive to a smooth adoption of the euro by
NMS in the future (Orlowski, 2005a).
Since this paper is devised as a policy discussion study, it is not intended to
provide comprehensive empirical evidence of superiority of one policy regime over its
alternatives. Nevertheless, some data on inflation trends in different time periods and
under various policy regimes are presented.
Section II contains a brief overview of the systemic evolution of monetary policy
regimes in NMS over the past two decades. Theoretical foundations of a common
currency area as outlined by Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1962) and Kenen (1969) are
overviewed in Section III. The historical record on EU monetary policies and their
inflationary effects is encapsulated in Section IV. Sections V and VI focus on monetary
policies that are believed to be effective for the euro-convergence. Section VII extracts
main lessons from the systemic evolution of monetary policies in Europe over the last 50
years and presents some suggestions for future policy modifications.
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II. Systemic Evolution of Monetary Policy Regimes in NMS
It is worthy noting that systemic changes in monetary policies in NMS over the past 20
years have been generally consistent with the evolution of the strategies outlined by the
so-called first and second generation models of the ‘Washington Consensus’ 1 . The
original models derived from the ‘Washington Consensus’ were based on simple precepts
of a free market system, namely stabilization, privatization and liberalization. These
policies have been adopted in a number of emerging market economies and carried over
through disciplined public finance, trade and financial liberalization, privatization of
state-owned enterprises and financial institutions, far-reaching deregulation and monetary
regimes based on fixed exchange rates (Williamson, 1990). Monetary policies that were
based on currency pegs were in essence non-autonomous, as they were based on pegging
national currencies to one (or more) of the leading industrial countries’ currencies. Such
arrangement allowed policy-makers to ‘borrow’ credibility from a foreign central bank,
which was essential for establishing initial, favorable conditions for price stability in a
domestic economy. More autonomous policy solutions were not plausible during the
initial period for a number of reasons. First, such policies could not be credible. Any
attempt of a central bank to tighten credit was unlikely to stem inflationary expectations
as long as public perceptions of the policy action were rather leery. A tightening action
could do little to lower the scope of nominal indexation of wages and prices of goods and
services. Clearly, a foundation of policy credibility had to be established first in order to
conduct effective monetary policies under more autonomous policy regimes. Second,
financial markets in transitional and emerging market economies were not sufficiently
developed to provide useful signals for forecasting inflation and other key policy
variables that divulge information indispensable for appropriate policy actions. Under
such circumstances, central banks in smaller economies were in fact ‘policy-takers’ or
close followers of policy directions of the monetary authorities in the countries their
currencies were pegged to. In quintessence, exchange-rate-based monetary policies could
not be effectively used to counteract real economy and financial shocks, thus to mitigate
the elevated inflation and interest rate risk premia (Orlowski, 2003).
The global financial crises episodes, particularly the Asian 1997/98 and the
Russian 1998 crises, have proven that exchange-rate-based monetary policies cannot be
effectively used for lowering inflation, reducing real currency appreciation and
containing large current account deficits. In order to accomplish the goal of price stability,
monetary policies had to be supported by appropriate institutional reforms. Learning
these valuable lessons from the currency crisis episodes of the 1990s, monetary
authorities in a number of industrial as well as emerging market economies have
switched to more autonomous monetary policy regimes. It was thus necessary to find an
effective anchor for monetary policies as a viable alternative to currency pegs that would
allow for achieving price stability. The choices were rather limited. Money growth
targeting could eventually contain inflation very effectively by imposing strict limits on
expansion of money balances. However, this policy framework could not be
implemented in a number of industrial and emerging market economies due to excessive
1

For a detailed analysis of the evolution of the macroeconomic stability models consistent with the early
and the most recent versions of the ‘Washington Consensus’, see Rodrick (2007).
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instability between money growth and inflation as well as other key monetary variables
such as exchange rates and interest rates, as proven empirically by Orlowski (2004).
Income targeting was another widely-debated policy solution. It would have to rely,
however, on real income growth targets that would normally call for expansionary
monetary policy even at times of elevated inflation expectations. Targeting real income
would certainly exacerbate inflationary pressures in the presence of nominal indexation
of wages and prices2. Considering such systemic pitfalls, marketed prominence has been
gained by policies based on direct inflation targeting (DIT) that have in fact helped
contain inflation, simultaneously preventing the perils of real currency appreciation.
In general terms, inflation targeting is a monetary policy framework that is geared
to achieving a pre-determined target for inflation. It serves as an effective medium for
guiding the private sector inflation expectations to the level prescribed by the credible,
low inflation target; at the same time, it allows for enough policy discretion to curtail
major shocks to financial stability. DIT is commonly defined as a monetary policy
framework in which a central bank adopts and publicizes an explicit numerical target for
inflation and assumes this target as the primary policy objective. As argued by King
(2005), DIT combines two distinctive elements of successful monetary policy: a mediumterm inflation target anchoring expectations, and a sufficient degree of policy discretion
for mitigating shocks. Thus in essence, DIT is guided by a “constrained discretion”
(Bernanke, et al., 1999). It is because it combines the discipline of a policy rule, i.e. a
binding inflation target, usually accompanied by a prescribed reaction function, with a
certain degree of discretion or flexibility. Under normal conditions, the numerical,
explicit inflation target entails an inflation tolerance band or a set of circumstances
allowing for temporary target overshooting. This in turn permits discretionary policy
actions aimed at correcting shocks to inflation. In practical terms, DIT shall not be based
on a rigid instrument (interest rate) rule or a compulsory policy reaction function that
prescribes instrument responses to a set of conditional economic variables (King, 1996,
2005). Simple instrument rules (such as open-economy Taylor rules) are likely to
generate suboptimal results in the presence of large, potentially destabilizing shocks
(Svensson, 2003). It shall be emphasized that DIT is intrinsically accompanied by a
flexible exchange rate regime. It is because an alternative combination of a currency peg
and an (indirect) inflation target would entail a number of policy conflicts that could pose
serious risks to financial stability. In the case of open emerging market economies, DIT
ought to consider an auxiliary exchange rate stability objective (Ball, 1999; Mishkin,
2000; Eichengreen, 2005; Orlowski and Rybinski, 2006), due to a serious risk of
transmission of exchange rate shocks to price volatility.
It is worthy noting that DIT accompanied by flexible exchange rates is viewed as
an integral part of more comprehensive macroeconomic policies consistent with the so-

2

A revealing lesson on experiments with regimes alternative to a currency peg is provided by the National
Bank of Poland, which enacted interest rate targeting in 1996, followed by a brief period of monetary based
and broad money growth targeting during 1997 and 1998 – all proven to be unsuccessful in containing
prolonged, double-digit inflation (Orlowski, 2004).
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called second generation models of the ‘Washington Consensus’.3 The proponents of the
original, first generation models had a tendency to embrace rules-based rather than
discretionary monetary policies since rules were meant to discipline the malfeasance of
governments (Rodrick, 2007). Consistently, central banks opted for explicit policies
based on currency pegs that played a critical role for restraining government spending
and nominal indexation of wages and prices. In contrast, the second generation models
have engendered a considerable degree of monetary policy discretion along with flexible
exchange rates drawing painful lessons from the disastrous consequences of overvalued
currencies, particularly in Latin American and East Asian economies.
Yet the tasks of convergence of NMS to the euro go beyond the standard set of
policy prescriptions offered by the modified ‘Washington Consensus’. The euro
candidates face serious constraints to their policy discretion. Monetary convergence
becomes effective when inflation rates, bond yields, basic consumer and producer prices
in the candidate countries ‘converge’ or come closer to their corresponding levels and
trends in the common currency area. Thus in essence, monetary authorities in the
converging economies act increasingly as non-autonomous ‘policy-takers’ rather than
independent ‘policy-makers’. On practical grounds, more pronounced constraints on
monetary policies stem from the Maastricht convergence criteria and the ERM2 (the
exchange rate mechanism 2) that impose restrictions on permissible currency volatility.
Thus reducing volatility or mitigating the exchange rate risk needs to be re-instated as a
leading or a supplemental monetary policy target (Orlowski, 2005a). It may well imply
that monetary policy strategy in NMS will have to make several sharp turns by starting
from the currency peg, followed by a switch to fully autonomous inflation targeting and
ultimately coming full circle to exchange rate stability as necessitated by the ERM2.
Ultimately, the candidates will have to lay out institutional foundations for a
common currency system as prescribed by various theories of an optimal currency area
(OCA). As these theorems imply, achieving ripeness for the (common currency) euro
adoption takes time. In line with this reasoning, a unilateral leap to the euro in the way
suggested among others by Begg, et. al (2003), could create a clash between the new
monetary policy and the under-reformed institutions, unprepared to function effectively
within the new set of conditions. In essence, a unilateral fast-track adoption of the euro
may exacerbate the default risk of the candidate countries. Therefore, broad institutional
reforms consistent with the basic precepts of OCA theorems are indispensable.
III. Euro as Optimal Currency Area – Theoretical Underpinnings
The original idea of a common currency for Europe was born on the grounds of a slower
economic growth of the European economies relative to that of the United States and
other industrial countries back in the 1960s and the early 1970s. This phenomenon was
commonly labeled as ‘the Eurosclerosis’. Among the factors contributing to the straggler
3

Other precepts of the ‘second generation models’ include improvements in corporate governance, poverty
reduction programs, reforms of social safety nets, anti-corruption legislation, more elaborate financial
codes and standards, as well as other institutional reforms whose examination lies outside the boundaries of
this study.

6
growth in Europe were growing asymmetries between the countries, as well as high
currency transaction and translation costs. The asymmetric effects were quite pronounced
– real GDP growth rates were rather unbalanced and inflation rates were largely
dispersed. As shown by the data in Table 1, inflation was particularly severe in Italy, less
pronounced in the United Kingdom and France and the lowest in Germany, especially
during the period 1970-1985. Amid concerns about the prevalent asymmetries, the idea
of a common currency became increasingly attractive. It was commonly believed that the
unified currency would bring a number of significant benefits including elimination of
large transaction costs and exchange rate risk that in turn would reinvigorate trade and
investment. Moreover, it would possibly diffuse asymmetric shocks with the help of
active fiscal policies within an OCA. Although it became apparent that a common
currency could bring forth a number of meaningful net benefits, the European countries
were not ready for a smooth convergence to a common currency area at that time.
Nevertheless, the European state of affairs motivated several leading academic
economists to articulate conditions and effective strategies for OCA. Prior to formulating
these strategies, it became necessary to identify key economic and political criteria for
OCA. The first one of the two economic criteria was to find ways to minimize
asymmetric shocks. The second one was to identify specific economic areas that were
unlikely to be affected by asymmetric shocks. The political criterion stemmed from a
question whether and to what extent the participating countries would be willing to help
each other cushion asymmetric shocks when they actually took place. Attempts to find
answers to these problems gave rise to the three principal OCA theorems.
The fist OCA theorem was developed by Robert Mundell (1961). The basic idea
underlying his approach is that OCA can only be effective if labor and capital, as the key
factors of production, are perfectly mobile across borders. Only in such case, the costs of
sharing the same currency will be eliminated. Moreover, since capital is likely to be
perfectly mobile in the case of eradicating governmental restrictions on its international
transfers, the fundamental problem is to eliminate the impediments to the mobility of
labor. As argued by Mundell, in the two-country case when one of them is experiencing
an excessive unemployment and the other struggles to reduce high inflation, an
unhindered transfer of labor from the first to the second one would alleviate the
fundamental imbalances in both countries. In this case, there is no need for price and
wage change in either country since the exchange rate automatically adjusts to its real
equilibrium level in response to the adjustment in the relative endowment of production
factors. Nevertheless, the Mundell’s perfect labor mobility scenario cannot be easily
implemented in practice due to the existing rigidities that can be eradicated only in the
very long-run. Among them are prevalent cultural and lingual differences among the
nations, the reality of which cannot be easily circumvented particularly in Europe. Other
rigidities to labor mobility include institutional barriers, which need to be coordinated
through at times lengthy legislative process. Moreover, consumer preferences for various
goods and services always differ among countries. This implies that workers producing
specific goods in one country will have to be retrained to make goods suitable for
somewhat different consumer tastes abroad. In hindsight, these impediments to labor
mobility suggest that an effective introduction of OCA constitutes a seemingly lengthy
process.
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Nevertheless, even if the existing impediments to labor mobility prevail, OCA can
still be effectively implemented in the absence of severe asymmetric demand shocks
within its potential territory. Such seminal extension to the original Mundell model was
proposed by Peter Kenen (1969). To reiterate Kenen’s model, OCA can effectively
function if it is not subject to large asymmetric shocks, particularly demand disturbances.
Yet it is unlikely to envisage that large asymmetric demand shocks may prevail in today’s
integrated world, particularly in Europe. A change in consumer tastes (such as a
tendency to favor larger, more comfortable cars) is likely to be transmittable across
continents and countries as consumers become equally exposed to global marketing
campaigns of multinational corporations or associations of producers. Also, changes in
technology transfer globally rather quickly (new-generation high-definition TVs are
available simultaneously across countries). Since large asymmetric shocks to consumer
demand are rather unlikely, the euro-area seems to remain unscathed as an OCA. In
addition, demand shocks are likely to be less pronounced in the economies that are well
diversified and producing similar goods as weights on specific goods potentially affected
by demand shocks in a total diverse basket of consumer goods are minimal. On the other
hand, a shock in a country narrowly specializing in few products only may generate
significant destabilizing effects. For this reason, OCA is likely to function much better in
the case of large, diversified economies, according to Kenen.
The third consequential OCA theorem has been proposed by Ronald McKinnon
(1962). In his scenario, OCA is formed by the economies that are open to trade and trade
heavily with each other. It is because many international goods are indistinguishable
from each other as they match global consumer preferences and product standards.
Therefore, if the economies remain wide open and exports are not subject to trade
barriers, there will be a tendency toward international equalization of prices of tradables
(as prescribed by the Samuelson’s price equalization theorem). Specifically, if there is a
domestic currency appreciation (or depreciation) in foreign currency terms, prices of
freely exchanged goods will rise (or fall) in domestic currency terms accordingly, thus
disentangling the link between the exchange rate and the domestic inflation. The price
equalization tendency will be therefore independent of the movement in the exchange
rate. Thus in essence, wide-open, highly integrated economies are likely to succeed in
forming an OCA.
A more recent, meaningful extension to the set of OCA criteria has been proposed
by Paul De Grauwe (2007) who underscores the importance of political integration of the
monetary union countries. The direct link between OCA and political integration can be
explained in two distinctive ways. First, synchronized political actions may reduce
asymmetric shocks that have a political origin. After all, fiscal policies in today’s euro
area remain in the hands of the national governments, while monetary policy is in essence
conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB). Consequently, spending patterns, tax
rates and budget deficits remain quite diverse within the union. However, from the
standpoint of mitigating asymmetric shocks, the member countries are currently engaging
in a fierce tax competition, which leads to more coordinated, lower taxes and simplified
tax laws. Second, arbitrary political actions, particularly those affecting the labor market
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(such as the 35-hour working week in France) are likely to exacerbate asymmetric shocks.
In all, further efforts toward political integration are necessary in order to mitigate such
shocks, thus to lay a more favorable ground for the monetary union to succeed.
To reiterate the OCA foundations, countries wishing to form OCA ought to be on
the one side sufficiently symmetric, and on the other their labor markets need to be
sufficiently flexible in order to be able to adjust to asymmetric shocks. In addition, they
should display a high degree of trade integration, as well as political integration with
other members of the union in order to reap the potential benefits from having a common
currency.
In light of the above theoretical precepts, it remains debatable whether the current
and the potentially enlarged euro area form in fact a viable and sustainable OCA. The
existing literature provides a favorable and optimistic account for the ECB policies aimed
at consolidating the euro area (Canova and Favero, 2007). The early studies preceding the
euro inception were predominantly optimistic as well. Among others, Frankel and Rose
(1998) suggested that although the euro area clearly violated optimality conditions of
OCA at its early stage, it was well suited to satisfy them increasingly in the future, as the
interplay between the economic and the monetary integration progresses.
The empirical evidence highlights the prominent role of ECB in consolidating the
euro area as OCA (Canova and Favero, 2007). One should bear in mind that the euro
inception strategy was a very risky scheme, yet the ECB managed the early stage of the
euro existence very well. The risks to the euro introduction stemmed from prevalent
asymmetries among the pioneer member countries – their economies were largely
heterogeneous, their legal and regulatory systems plagued by vast historical differences,
and their policy-makers preferences were not always set on the painful at times process of
monetary convergence. Nevertheless, there was a substantial institutional progress in
merging diverse monetary policies of the eleven central banks into a single policy
framework managed by the ECB. Also, the harmonization of banking regulatory and
supervisory systems was successfully completed enabling a smooth replacement of
individual currencies by the euro.
During the past eight years since the inception of the euro, the ECB has emerged
as a credible, highly transparent and accountable monetary authority, disqualifying the
early doubts about the ability to achieve such a record by a young institution formed on
the basis of previously untested experiments. Moreover, the ECB has managed to bring
the euro area inflation rate to the low level that was unattainable for most of the member
countries for decades (as shown in Table 1). A crucial role in the ECB success was in fact
played by the bank’s relatively high (although not perfect) transparency (Eijffinger and
Geraats, 2006). Its board members have provided exhaustive explanations about their
policy intensions and specific strategies. As a result, its operational framework and
expected decisions have become clear and highly predictable to the business community
as well as to financial markets and institutions. By matching actions with declared policy
intensions the ECB have become a credible and reputable central bank in a remarkably
short period of time. The second important factor contributing to the ECB overall success
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was the strongly emphasized (although not very explicit) attention to lowering inflation,
which resulted in guiding inflation expectations to the announced low target level.
The ECB monetary policy strategy has evolved as well. The initial policy
framework adopted by the ECB Governing Council in October 1998 was based on three
defining features. The first one - a predominant focus on price stability - implied that
alternative policy objectives such as output growth or exchange rate stability received
little to none attention. A specific target range for inflation was the second feature.
However, the target was not specified as a midpoint for inflation based on a harmonized
index of consumer prices in the euro area that would be surrounded by a tolerance band.
Instead, the ECB stated that inflation should be ‘below 2 percent’ thus defining the target
only in terms of its upper boundary. Finally, the so-called ‘two-pillar strategy’ was the
third distinctive and a bit unusual feature of the ECB policy. The first pillar was adopted
from the policy practice of the Bundesbank and was based on a quantitative reference
value for the broad M3 money growth. The second pillar included a wide range of
economic and financial indicators presumably affecting the outlook for price stability.
Although it was criticized in a number of studies, the early ECB policy played an
instrumental role for establishing solid foundations of price stability and for gaining vital
policy credibility.
A major reformulation of the monetary policy framework was enacted by the
ECB in May 2003. Evaluating soundness of the policy framework in terms of its
outcomes and responding to the criticism of the two-pillar strategy, the Governing
Council changed definitions of both pillars in the directions departing from purely
monetarist foundations. Within the new framework, the first pillar is now prescribed as
an ‘economic analysis’ that is essential for identifying short- to medium-term risks to
price stability. The second pillar termed as ‘monetary analysis’ focuses on estimation of
inflation trends and forecasts. In essence, the policy has become more forward-looking,
thus aimed at guiding inflation expectations to the announced target. The target itself was
slightly modified as well, becoming qualified as ‘below but close to 2 percent’. Such restatement made the target a bit more achievable, thus also more credible. In addition, the
new policy focuses on medium-term price stability and on the existing differentials in
local inflation rates in participating countries. The forward-looking, medium term
inflation focus has become more realistic and plausible as the series of data that is
indispensable for estimating inflation forecasts is now longer and more reliable.
In sum, the ECB has been able to manage inflation successfully through its
relatively transparent policies emphasizing compliance with the inflation target.
Moreover, the local or regional inflation differentials as well as spreads between member
countries’ sovereign bond yields have been compressed reasonably well. In spite of these
successes, the remaining asymmetries within the euro remain to be quite large (De
Grauwe, 2007). Countries like Ireland and Greece have recently experienced robust real
GDP growth rates and positive output gaps (actual GDP exceeding its potential level). In
contrast, Portugal and the Netherlands have encountered recessionary tendencies and
negative output gaps. At the same time, regional inflation rates in the fast growing
economies exceed the HICP-based average inflation. Moreover, since fiscal policies are
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managed by local authorities, the euro area members do not show uniformity in fiscal
discipline. Consequently, their real interest rates are elevated (most notably in Austria)
and sovereign bond yields are higher than in the remaining member countries.
Nevertheless, the euro area continues to function well as an OCA in spite of the
remaining asymmetries.
The problem of internal asymmetries is also very important from the standpoint of
the future enlargement of the euro area. NMS as potential candidates have considerably
lower both incomes per capita and wage rates; their growth rates are much higher than
those of the incumbent member countries and their sovereign bond yields contain
considerable risk premia stemming from higher inflation expectations and excessive
volatility of exchange rates (Orlowski, 2003, 2005a). For these reasons, the euro area is
likely to experience more pronounced asymmetries following the admission of the new
members. However, these imbalances can be reasonably expected to disappear gradually
as the convergence of prices, wages and interest rates continues.
In sum, one can be reasonably optimistic about the future of the euro area
considering its far-reaching consolidation thus far. However, full benefits from the
monetary integration will be materialized only if there is a further progress in resolving
the current economic and political asymmetries or discrepancies between the incumbent
and the candidate countries.
IV. Disinflation and Euro-Convergence – The EU Historical Record
The attractiveness of long-term net benefits of OCA as identified by its main theories
motivated the European leaders to devise plans for introducing a common currency. The
first comprehensive attempt to do so was encapsulated in the Werner Report of 1970,
following the Hague Summit of 1969. The Report called for establishing the EMU by
1980, which failed to materialize as it relied almost exclusively on coordination of
exchange rates without an adequate focus on fiscal and monetary convergence. The high
inflation episodes in the early 1970, accompanied by real appreciation of currencies in the
leading industrial countries and by large current account imbalances contributed to the
operational failure of the Werner Report. Yet, the Report provided valuable lessons for
articulating conditions of a common currency area and for devising appropriate policies
for its introduction as well as future sustainability.
Unlike the first attempt to introduce the European common currency, the second,
more comprehensive program was in fact successful. It was based on the Delors Report
that was formally adopted at the Madrid Summit in July 1989. Using the Delors Report
as a guidepost, two intergovernmental conferences were convened to outline strategies
for the creation of the economic and monetary union. The findings and policy suggestions
of these conferences served as a basis for the Council meeting held in Maastricht at the
end of 1991, which devised the Maastricht Treaty containing the criteria for fiscal and
monetary convergence to the common currency. Eight years later, on January 4, 1999 the
euro was smoothly introduced as a legal tender in 11 EU member countries, whose
exchange rate were irrevocably frozen and national central banks ceded monetary policy-
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making to the ECB. At the beginning of 2002, euro currency replaced national currencies
cash balances. The euro-convergence process was successful for a number of reasons.
Chief among them was compliance with the criteria for fiscal discipline (government
budget deficits not exceeding 3 percent and the public debt lower than 60 percent of
GDP). Equally important was the institutional leadership; the early unsuccessful
exchange rate mechanism was lacking operational support of a single institution such as
the ECB. In addition, the euro program was coherent and robust, contrasting the
vagueness of the previous plans. Notably, the convergence to the euro was accompanied
by the absence of capital controls that were eliminated within the participating member
states as early as in 1990. In general terms, the replacement of highly autonomous
monetary policies of national central banks with a single, cohesive policy of the ECB that
was modeled on the Bundesbank policy helped infuse the essential foundational
credibility to the newly formed monetary authority. As a result, the entire euro area has
enjoyed a considerably lower inflation relative to the previous bothersome levels in the
member states.
The interplay between systemic changes in monetary policies and inflation in
Europe can be broadly examined on the basis of the data shown in Table 1. Generally
speaking, over the past 50 years monetary authorities in Europe have actively responded
to the recurrent inflationary developments. During the period immediately following the
enactment of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, inflation seemed to be well-contained. The
upper half of Table 1 shows the annual rates of CPI-based inflation in the largest EU
economies (Germany, France, United Kingdom and Italy) as well as the average rates for
the 15 EU Member States that comprised the Union prior to its 2004 enlargement. At the
beginning of the European integration process in 1960 the inflation levels were generally
low, but they pick up steam five years later (with the notable exception of France). The
generally elevated inflation rates were attributable to more expansionary fiscal policies,
as well as robust real GDP growth rates propelled by high domestic demand. In contrast,
the 1970s brought a very different story. Much elevated inflation rates, particularly in
1975 in the aftermath of the major worldwide oil crisis became a major concern for
monetary policy-makers in Europe. Germany was more successful in controlling
inflation than its major European counterparts, mainly because the Bundesbank adopted
very restrictive monetary policy based on targeting growth rates of broad monetary
aggregates. As mentioned above, the accelerated inflation trend in the 1970 destroyed
the realization of the Werner Plan, causing deferment of the full-fledged monetary
unification.
….. insert Table 1 around here …..
The second oil shock at the beginning of the 1980 did not help European countries
resolve the perils of inflation. Recognizing the danger of inflation expectations, the
European authorities established foundations for the second plan of monetary union the
precepts of which were formalized by the Maastricht Treaty. The major efforts toward
fiscal consolidation along with restrictive monetary policies were quite successful in
laying favorable ground for a smooth process of monetary convergence. By the mid1990s, EU countries regained effective control over inflation. Germany and France relied
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on highly autonomous money targeting policies that helped contain nominal indexation
thus also reduce the scope of inflation expectations. Eager to enter the EMU as one of its
pioneer members, Italy had to undertake major efforts to reduce its humongous public
debt that exceeded 100 percent of GDP at the beginning of the 1990s. Fiscal
consolidation enabled the Bank of Italy to discontinue its traditional practice of
generating seigniorage revenues for the budget, i.e. revenues from printing money. Such
money creation was in fact a strong pro-inflationary factor in Italy before.
Since the inception of the euro in 1999, inflation in the EU has not been a major
problem for policy-makers. Needless to say, the process of monetary and fiscal
consolidation has played a pivotal role for achieving a satisfactory degree of price
stability. As a result, inflation expectations and nominal indexation in the euro area are
subdued, which results in expanded time horizon for investments due to lower financial
risk. In response to lower inflation expectations, savings rates and productivity growth
rates have been quite strong; they have helped restrain inflation further, although
contributed to growing current account surpluses in the larger EU countries.
Disinflationary policies have not entailed excessive welfare costs – they have not
contributed to economic recession in Europe. As shown in Table 2, growth rates among
the leading four European economies back in 1990 were significantly asymmetric, with
Germany growing at a much faster rate than the remaining three countries. Since 1995
the growth has been considerably more synchronized. All four countries experienced an
accelerated growth around the year of 2000, followed by a near-zero slowdown in 2005,
and a discernible pickup in 2006. Thus evidently, the inflation focusing conduct of
monetary policy has not generated a detrimental effect on the real economy growth and,
very likely, has laid solid foundation for a sustained long-term recovery accompanied by
perceptible price stability.
….. insert Table 2 around here …..
Nevertheless, as underscored by the prevalent asymmetries discussed above, a
‘full’ monetary union is yet to be achieved in the EU. Unlike monetary policy that has
been uniformly managed by the ECB in the euro area, fiscal policies have been
conducted by national governments and not necessarily coordinated. It seems that at the
present time competitive rather than synchronized fiscal policies prevail, as underscored
by a fierce tax competition among the member countries. An effective coordination of
fiscal policy is needed without delay in order to alleviate the existing asymmetries within
the euro area, particularly given the perspective of future admission of new members
V. Cohesion of New Member States and Disinflation
The progress of NMS toward achieving price stability has been also quite remarkable.
Without doubt, the price stability has been achieved through the efforts satisfying the
requirements of disciplined fiscal and monetary policies incorporated in the EU accession
programs. In contrast to the early reforms that were based on the original set of freemarket precepts prescribed by the Washington Consensus, preparations for accession to
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the European Union have been based on a much broader set of reforms encapsulated by
the so-called Copenhagen Summit criteria.
These accession criteria were laid out by the European Council meeting in
Copenhagen at the end of 1993. They are generalized within three main venues: political,
economic and administrative. Specifically, the candidates are required to achieve a
functioning democracy with universal voter franchise, the rule of law and the protection
of human rights. On economic grounds, the candidates are expected to develop a
functioning free market economy that would be capable of withstanding competition
from foreign goods that are allowed free access to their markets. In addition, they need to
show progress toward a sustainable macroeconomic stability along with the development
of modern economic institutions. In administrative terms, each candidate needs to
demonstrate that it is capable of transposing and administering the laws, directions and
regulations of the EU, which comprise thirty different chapters of the acquis
communautaire.
A visible progress toward disinflation and price stability is a logical outcome of
increased competition, liberalization and privatization espoused by the accession criteria.
Specifically, efforts toward increased competition, trade liberalization, disciplined fiscal
and monetary policies and improved institutional efficiency all lead to a sustainable price
stability. As shown in Table 1, the tasks of lowering inflation have been monumental,
particularly for Poland and Hungary. Poland’s comprehensive reform program enacted in
the beginning of 1990 was based on a massive liberalization of previously regulated
prices, with a simultaneous elimination of almost all barriers to trade. As a result of price
liberalization, prices immediately jumped to domestic market equilibrium levels
generating a ‘corrective inflation’ at the annual rate close to 600 percent. It has taken
almost a decade to bring the Polish inflation down to single digit levels. The National
Bank of Poland searched for an appropriate monetary policy to accomplish this task. First,
it maintained a fixed exchange rate regime that was subsequently replaced with monetary
base targeting and then interest rate targeting. But inflation was not decisively lowered
until the NBP enacted DIT at the beginning of 1999. The Czech National Bank did not
need to struggle with corrective inflation of a similar magnitude, although it faced
difficulties to reduce it to less than 5 percent during the first seven years of the economic
transformation, when monetary policy was based on a rigid currency peg. As in the case
of Poland, inflation had begun to fall once the CNB enacted DIT in 1998. In a similar
vein, the Hungarian fixed exchange rate regime (based on a crawling devaluation system)
did not curtail inflation effectively. Hungary’s inflation started to fall only after the
National Bank of Hungary formally switched to DIT in May 2001 (and particularly after
it abandoned the crawling devaluation scheme in October 2001)4.
It is becoming apparent that the price stability in NMS contributes to economic
growth since it lowers risk premia for investors, promotes growth of long-term consumer
credit, thus consequently increases business fixed investment. The lagged, yet
pronounced impact of monetary stability on real GDP growth rates in NMS is shown in
4

See Jonas and Mishkin (2005), Orlowski (2005a), Matoušek and Taci (2003), among others, for a more
detailed examination of DIT regimes in NMS.
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Table 2. At the beginning of economic transformation, these distorted, non-competitive
economies were experiencing severe recessions. Yet since the mid-1990s, they have been
continuously enjoying accelerated economic growth, which picked up steam in recent
years, in the aftermath of the EU accession and the well-enrooted monetary and financial
stability. The accelerated economic growth is an important factor generating more
favorable conditions for the future adoption of the euro. Faster growth helps alleviate the
problem of asymmetries within the future enlarged euro area, as it contributes to a lower
ratio of public debt to GDP and reduces income per capita and wage differentials. It can
be thus perceived as an important condition for the adoption of the euro – perhaps more
relevant that the formal Maastricht convergence criteria (Kenen and Meade, 2003; De
Grauwe, 2007). Arguably, a long-run success of the future enlargement of the euro area
will depend on the degree of compliance with OCA precepts, particularly with the ability
to reduce the scope of the existing economic and political asymmetries, and not on the
strict adherence to the arbitrary set of the Maastricht criteria.
VI. Direct Inflation Targeting and Euro-Convergence of New EU Members
Devising optimal monetary policies that will guide NMS toward a smooth adoption of the
euro is a complex task. There is no clear agreement on a uniform monetary policy in the
literature addressing this subject. It seems that a fast-track approach calling for a speedy
unilateral adoption of the euro advocated among others by Buiter and Grafe (2002) or
Begg et. al, (2003) has little merit. Proposals for more gradual convergence policies
seem to be now favored by both academic experts and policy makers. They range from
monetary policy regimes based on flexible exchange rate targeting to fully autonomous
policies based on flexible inflation targeting. There is, however, an agreement that the
smaller NMS, such as the Baltic States, have made the right decision by choosing
currency board arrangements based on fixed parity rates of their currencies to the euro, as
an appropriate solution for their monetary convergence. This is a prudent choice,
considering the fact that their sovereign bond markets are rather underdeveloped, thus
experiencing excessive volatility. Such highly unstable markets are not capable of
providing useful signals for conducting more autonomous and credible DIT policies,
particularly those that are forward-looking, based on forecast variables.
There is a common caption in the literature that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’
prescription for monetary policy on the passage toward the euro. Outside the concensus
that on the eve of the euro adoption monetary autonomy of the candidates will have to be
relinquished, the preceding policy solutions are subject to a sprawling debate. At least
three policy proposals for the passage toward the euro can be extracted from the existing
literature. The least autonomous variant of monetary policy that is based on flexible
exchange rate targeting is advocated by Bofinger and Wollmershäuser (2001). More
autonomous variants of flexible DIT include the ‘dual target-single instrument’ strategy
examined by Jonas (2006), and the ‘dual target-dual instrument’ strategy proposed by
Orlowski and Rybinski (2006).
The flexible exchange rate targeting approach assigns strong preference to the
exchange rate stability target while downplaying instability of alternative goals such as
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inflation or output gap. However, this policy variant implies a radical regime switch from
DIT that is currently pursuit by the larger NMS to exchange rate stability. Its
implementation necessitates frequent and costly foreign exchange market interventions,
particularly during financial markets turbulance, or at any times when institutionally
unprepared, underdeveloped markets are vulnerable to large nominal shocks. It also
remains doubtful whether a monetary regime based on exchange rate stability (even in a
stricter form than the one allowed by the ERM2) will in fact contribute to price stability,
due to the unsteady exchange rate channel of monetary policy transmission, as shown
empirically by Golinelli and Rovelli (2005), Kočenda and Valachy (2006) or Orlowski
(2005a).
A more autonomous ‘dual target – single instrument’ strategy is an attractive
although a bit implausible policy option. It is in essence an extension to the present DIT
regimes that places an equal weight on the inflation and the exchange rate stability goals.
However, both of them are implemented by using the interest rate (a central bank’s
reference rate) as a single instrument. This may entail a number of conflicts between
these goals. For instance, large capital inflows may precipitate both excessive inflation
and currency appreciation – the first one could be cured by raising, while the second one
by lowering the interest rate.
To alleviate such ‘traps’ in policy instrumentalization, the ‘dual target – dual
instrument’ variant introduces dichotomy between realization of the inflation target,
managed by adjusting the interest rate, and realization of the exchange rate stability
objective secured through foreign exchange market interventions. In a forward-looking
policy scenario that is more applicable to the larger NMS, major deviations from
(forecast-based) inflation targets are counteracted with changes in interest rates, while
excessive volatility of the exchange rate is corrected with interventions. Moreover, as
current interest rates in the euro-candidate countries still carry high inflation risk premia,
any positive deviation of the inflation forecast from the target will have to be contained
with a fairly large increase in interest rates. In contrast, a negative deviation does not
need to be counreacted by a symmetric decrease in interest rates. In this sense, the upper
and lower boundaries of the inflation target in the countries converging to the euro are
inherently asymmetric (Orlowski, 1995a).
Considering the tasks of monetary convergence to the euro, strict DIT policies
become seemingly irrelevant. Clearly, convergence necessitates supplementing the
inflation target with an exchange rate stability objective, as policy-makers need to secure
both price and exchange rate stability (Orlowski, 2007). Among the recent proposals for
a DIT regime that entails convergence variables is the ‘relative inflation forecast
targeting’ (RIFT) policy framework advanced by Orlowski (2005b, 2007). Stating
briefly, RIFT is based on targeting the differentials between the forecasts for domestic
and the euro are inflation rates. It also allows for mitigating potentially destabilizing
shock to the exchange rate with market interventions. But in principle, RIFT assign
priority to lowering inflation over reducing exchange rate volatility when possible
conflicts between both policy objectives take place (such as in a case of unexpectedly
large capital inflows).
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The question arises whether the systemic changes in NMS follow the logic of
flexible inflation targeting models that incorporate objectives of monetary convergence.
As indicated in the preceding section, monetary authorities in the three largest NMS have
chosen DIT as appropriate regimes for developing sustainable financial stability that is
indispensable for convergence to the euro. The systemic evolution of their DIT policies
is synthesized in Table 3.
….. insert Table 3 around here …..
The initial regimes were quite simple, i.e. based on year-end targets, set at
ambitious levels and surrounded by narrow tolerance bands. Such straightforward
specification was intended to underscore the policy-makers strong commitment to
disinflation, particularly that actual inflation rates were still excessively high at that time.
In the case of Poland, the ambitious original target was clearly missed in December 1999.
Apparently, it took some time for DIT regimes to become credible, i.e. to align inflation
expectations with the official target. Moreover, the reference interest rates were
extremely high – all three central banks set them at double-digit levels. Correspondingly,
long-term bond yields were also excessive, reflecting much elevated risk premia.
Once the foundations of monetary and financial stability have been in place, the
DIT regimes have become more flexible and increasingly forward looking. The present
policies are based on linear target trajectories for inflation with the midpoint satisfying
the Maastricht inflation criterion (estimated to oscillate currently around 3.5 percent, or
1.5 percent above the average of the three lowest inflation rates among the EU 27
members). The actual realization of the inflation target in the Czech Republic and Poland
is satisfactory, while in Hungary the recent fiscal instability imposes a large inflation risk
premium elevating the CPI-based inflation to 8.8 percent on a year-on-year basis. The
inflation targets in the first two countries are secured with the reference interest rates that
are now below the target level for the U.S. federal funds rate and close to the ECB rates.
Their bond yields also seem to satisfy the Maastricht long-term interest rate criterion. By
these measures, Hungary remains to be an outlier in need of improving fiscal discipline
and reinforcing the autonomy of the central bank. It is also worthy noting that all three
central banks are highly transparent, their inflation forecasts or projections are clearly
formulated and made available to the public at large (Jarmuzek, et. al, 2004). Inflation
reports, press releases and official communications are regularly published; and the
policy targets, indicator variables as well as operational procedures are continuously
updated on the central banks websites.
Further improvements of monetary policies toward their greater clarity and
predictability depend on the circumstances that are largely outside of central banks
control. The three NMS governments will be well-advised to express more specific
commitment to adopt the euro, with clearly stated deadlines and cohesive convergence
policies that are thoroughly explained to the public at large. The experience of the initial
euro area members in this respect may provide valuable lessons for the new euro
candidates.
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VII. Summary and Lessons for Future Monetary Policies in the European Union
The monetary integration in Europe has undergone a remarkable progress since the
initiation of the economic and political unification by the Treaty of Rome fifty years ago.
A major impetus to the monetary unification was the Delors Report of 1989 and the
Maastricht Treaty of 1991 that provided lucid guidelines streamlining the process of
monetary convergence to the common currency. The theories of optimum currency area
advanced by Mundell (1961), Kenen (1969) and McKinnon (1962) provided valuable
guidance for preparation of these documents and for outlining individual countries’
convergence programs. In fact, over the years it has become apparent that the success of
the European monetary unification depends on the ability to mitigate the prevalent
economic and political asymmetries among the member countries. Convergence policies
of the initial EMU members supported by the various programs of the European
Commission have apparently focused on alleviating these discrepancies. But this task
has not been fully completed yet.
The economic imbalances and asymmetric shocks are likely to intensify upon the
future entry of NMS to the euro area. It is therefore imperative that the euro candidates
enact and implement appropriate monetary, fiscal and institutional policies aimed at
mitigating these disparities. With respect to monetary policies that are suitable for
convergence to the euro, the larger NMS may benefit from modified DIT strategies that
incorporate the main convergence tasks and objectives, including stability of the
exchange rate. Strict DIT policies focusing exclusively on narrowly defined targets for
domestic inflation are not conducive to monetary convergence. Forward-looking,
flexible DIT strategies focusing on targeting the differential between the domestic and the
euro area inflation forecasts offer a viable policy option for smooth convergence to the
euro. It is equally imperative that the candidates undertake efforts aimed at reinforcing
OCA criteria, i.e. favorable conditions for increasing labor mobility, trade openness,
symmetric consumer preferences and political integration for a succession and for the
future enlargement of the euro area.
On practical grounds, valuable information about dynamics of the prevalent
asymmetries can be extracted from directional changes in spreads between yields on
long-term sovereign bonds of the candidates and the euro area. In essence, the yield
compression would indicate reduction of the asymmetries, at least those that are taken
into consideration by the bond markets. It is not unreasonable to believe that these
markets react to a wide-range of asymmetric shocks.
It shall be further noted that monetary authorities alone cannot pursue
convergence programs and operational tasks. Political commitment of governments
seeking social endorsement for a future monetary integration plays a pivotal role in this
process. As De Grauwe (2007) points out, the continuing process of political unification
is absolutely critical for avoiding fragility of the euro area and reducing the skepticism
about its future viability.
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Table 1: Annual CPI-Based Inflation Rates in Europe
1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

Germany
France
UK
Italy
EU15avg

1.5
4.1
1.0
1.4
2.0

3.2
2.7
4.8
4.4
5.0

3.4
5.8
6.4
4.8
5.0

5.9
11.7
24.2
16.9
14.2

5.4
13.5
18.0
21.3
13.6

2.2
5.8
6.1
9.2
7.5

2.7
3.4
9.5
6.5
6.8

1.7
1.8
3.4
5.2
3.1

1.9
1.7
2.9
2.5
3.4

2.0
1.8
2.1
2.0
2.6

Poland
Czech R.
Hungary

-

-

-

-

-

-

585.8
9.5
29.0

27.9
9.2
28.3

10.1
3.8
9.8

2.1
1.8
3.6

Data Source: International Monetary Fund: International Financial Statistics and World
Economic Outlook Tables Database (May 2007).
Table 2: Real GDP Growth Rates.
1990

1995

2000

2005

2006

Germany
France
UK
Italy

+5.7
+2.7
+0.1
+2.1

+1.9
+1.8
+2.9
+2.8

+3.1
+4.0
+3.8
+3.6

+0.9
+1.2
+1.9
+0.1

+2.7
+2.0
+2.7
+1.9

Poland
Czech R.
Hungary

-7.2
-1.2
-3.5

+6.8
+6.4
+3.5

+4.2
+3.9
+5.2

+3.5
+6.1
+4.2

+5.8
+6.1
+3.9

Data Source: International Monetary Fund: World Economic Outlook Tables Database
(May 2007).
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Table 3: Systemic evolution of inflation targeting in NMS.

DIT inception date
Type of DIT:
Initial
Present
Target specification:
Initial
Present
Intermediate target level:
Initial year
Present (May 2007)
Actual realization:
Initial year
Present (April 2007)
Corresponding exchange rate
regime:
Initial
Present
Corresponding central bank
reference interest rate:
Initial
Present (May 2007)
Ten-year Treasury bond yield
(month average):
December 2000
May 2007
Target announcements
Forward-looking mechanism

Inflation reports
Official euro adoption

Czech Republic

Poland

Hungary

January 1998

January 1999

June 2001

strict
flexible

strict
strict

flexible
flexible

Net infl., year-end
CPI, flat linear
trajectory (as of 2006)

CPI, year-end
CPI, flat linear
trajectory (as of 2004)

CPI, year-end
CPI, flat trajectory
(as of 2007)

5.5-6.5% (Dec.1998)
3.0% , no band

6.6-7.8 (Dec. 1999)
2.5%, +/- 1% band

6.0-8.0% (Dec.2001)
3.5%, +/- 1% band

1.7% net, 6.8% CPI
(Dec. 1998)
2.5%

9.8% (Dec. 1999)

6.8% (Dec. 2001)

2.3%

8.8%

pure float
managed float

crawling (wide) band
pure float, as of April00

crawling peg
ERM2 shadowing

14.75% (Jan. 1998)
2.75%

13.0% (Jan. 1999)
4.25%

11.0% (June 2001)
8.00%

7.38%
4.21%
CNB Board in
consultation with MF
Inflation forecasts
revised monthly

11.37%
5.25%
NBP Monetary Policy
Council
Inflation “projection”

Annual, quarterly
Convergence
program, no date

Annual, quarterly
Convergence program,
no date

8.00%
6.53%
H. Government
and NBH Board
Rolling inflation
forecasts for six
quarters ahead
Annual, quarterly
Convergence
program, no date

Source: author’s own compilation based on CNB, NBP and NBH reports and data.
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